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Abstract
We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common pref-
erences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in the form of
types (signals). We assume that types are distributed from a state-dependent continuous
distribution. In this model, Bayesian equilibrium voting and efficient voting coincide, and
informative voting means that a voter votes in favor of the issue if and only if the signal
exceeds a cut-point level. Our main result is an answer, in the form of a condition on the
parameters of the model, to the question when informative voting is efficient.
Keywords: private information, efficient information aggregation, strategic voting.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D70, D71, D80, D82
1 Introduction
In many decision making situations, a group of people needs to accept or reject an issue.
A policy is approved or rejected in a referendum; a defendant is convicted or acquitted
by the jury in a court trial; a job candidate is hired or not by a hiring committee and
so on. We focus on such collective decision making problems assuming that members of
the committee share a common goal. Indeed, in both the jury and the hiring committee
examples, it seems natural to assume that each member of the group agrees on the common
goal, such as convicting the defendant if and only if she is guilty and hiring the candidate
if and only if she is good at research. Similarly, in the referendum example, voters may
all agree that approving the policy is good if and only if implementing it has a low cost.
If any disagreements occur among the members, this may be caused by holding different
kinds of evidence (about the defendant, the candidate or the costs of implementation of a
new policy), or attaching different interpretations to the evidence.
In this paper, we model such situations as voting problems where individuals have
state-dependent common preferences, but hold private information about what the state
might be. One alternative is better than the other alternative for every voter under one
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state while the converse holds if the other state occurs. (We sometimes call this alternative
the ‘correct’ alternative.) We express private information or evidence by voters’ types
(i.e., signals) and we specifically focus on the problem of designing a voting rule. A
desirable property of a voting rule in this setting is that it should lead to ‘truthful’ voting
behavior, in the sense of following the evidence. A voting rule that generates this behavior
allows for correct information aggregation, as the votes reveal the private information of
individuals. Since all members of the group aim for reaching the better alternative, the
voting rule should ideally lead to the outcomes that are most likely correct, given the
available information; hence, aggregate private information efficiently. In this paper, we
want to find out when voting rules exist which make truthful voting behavior efficient or,
equivalently here, a Bayesian equilibrium.
The work on binary collective choice problems with common goals and private inform-
ation started with the seminal works by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997). In this framework, they show that it need not be rational for
all voters to vote truthfully. Taking this into account, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)
analyse asymptotic efficiency while Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) derive the conditions
under which truthful voting occurs in equilibrium. The private information of a voter
takes a binary value in these works. Duggan and Martinelli (2001) and Meirowitz (2002)
extend these models by considering continuous rather than binary private information.
They characterize the equilibrium of the game under fixed mechanisms and prove a jury
theorem where the probability of a mistaken decision goes to zero as the size of the jury in-
creases (with the exception of unanimity rule). One may think of several situations where
private information of a voter cannot be summarized by a discrete variable or as indicating
only ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The evidence regarding the job candidate’s skills in teaching may include
the student evaluations, which take values in a given interval. The belief of a juror about
a defendant may be less conclusive than ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’. Such information may be
private or partly private: members of the hiring committee or jurors in a court of law
may have access to different sources of information or may interpret the available evidence
differently. In this paper, we assume that the private information of a voter is drawn
from a continuous distribution and we aim to find whether there exist voting rules which
lead to truthful behavior as well as efficient outcomes. We generally mean ‘informative
voting’ by truthful behavior. In case of binary types, informativeness is easily defined as
revealing the type information in the vote. In our paper, an informative voter who holds
a type above a given cut-point accepts the issue, Similarly, an informative voter holding
a type below the cut-point rejects the issue.1 Our model is similar to that of Duggan and
Martinelli (2001) but we focus on mechanism design and any size of committees instead of
equilibrium analysis under a fixed mechanism and large committees. Our paper can also
be seen as an extension of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) to a continuum of types.
It turns out that once we move from binary types to a continuum of types, we depart
from previous results. We show that a voting rule which makes informative voting efficient
exists under a specific condition on the model parameters. This result is in contrast with
the one in Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014), where there always exists a voting rule
1In our model, the higher values of a type indicate a higher likelihood that accepting the issue is the
correct decision. Similarly, the lower values indicate a higher likelihood that rejecting the issue is the
correct decision.
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efficiently aggregating private information when types are binary.2 The condition under
which such a rule exists in our model (see Theorem 2) implies that there exists a threshold
such that whenever an issue is more likely to be correct than not given all the available
information, it should be more likely to be correct based on the information about the
number of types exceeding this threshold. When the condition holds, i.e., this threshold
exists, the informative strategy must be defined with this threshold as the cut-point and
a quota rule must be used to make informative voting efficient. Hence, when private
information reflects a richer set of possibilities rather than indicating ‘yes’ or ‘no’ only, a
voting rule cannot always aggregate the whole available information efficiently.3
There are other related contributions focusing on information aggregation. In a recent
work, Barelli, Bhattacharya, and Siga (2017) analyze asymptotic efficiency in a setting
where there are at least two alternatives, voters have common state-dependent prefer-
ences but hold private signals which do not necessarily come from a set identical to the
state space. Using majority rule as the mechanism, they show that there exists a sequence
of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information as the group size goes to infinity only
when the signal space is rich enough relative to the state space. Although we share in
common that the signal and the state spaces do not coincide (and this plays an important
role in both results), we depart from this work by considering a binary issue, and taking
a mechanism design approach for small committees instead of focusing on information ag-
gregation in large elections under a fixed mechanism. There is another strand of literature
focusing on mechanism design for collective choice problems with two alternatives. Some
of these works assume private values such as Azrieli and Kim (2014), who show that a
rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule. Schmitz and
Tro¨ger (2012) consider a model in which the voters’ utility profile is drawn from a joint
distribution, and each voter’s utility is private knowledge and expresses her preference
between two alternatives; a choice rule assigns to each reported profile the probabilities
with which the final alternative is chosen. In our model each voter can assess the prob-
ability of each state given her private information, and these probabilities play the role
of the utilities in the Schmitz-Tro¨ger model. Hence, we focus on a much more detailed
version of their model, and therefore are able to express our results on the basis of these
details, namely the objective probabilities of the states and the signal functions, as well
as the binary voting method.
Truthful behavior might alternatively be represented by ‘sincere voting’, which means
voting without taking other voters into consideration. The classical Condorcet jury the-
orem framework does not distinguish between informative and sincere behavior; moreover,
assumes that voters always vote informatively. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) show that
this assumption is inconsistent with a game-theoretic view of collective behavior. As the
equivalence of sincere behavior and informative behavior cannot be taken for granted,
in Section 3 we determine the condition under which a sincere voter votes informatively
(see Theorem 1). This condition determines the particular informative strategy defined
by a cut-point which should balance the role of prior beliefs. Section 4 focuses on the
2They mainly analyse multi-issue voting, where a voter receives a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ signal for each issue. The
one issue model appears as a special case of their model.
3Of course, a basic assumption of our model is that voters can only vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for each issue, but
this is also a realistic assumption in most applications, like the ones mentioned above.
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key question of efficient information aggregation. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in
Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a group of voters, labelled i = 1, ..., n, where n ≥ 2. This group needs to
collectively accept or reject an issue. This issue may represent a referendum, a policy,
or a judgment on whether a defendant in a court is guilty. A vote takes the form 1 or
0 which means ‘accept/yes’ or ‘reject/no’ respectively. After all voters cast their votes,
a collective decision in {0, 1} is taken using a voting rule. Formally, a voting rule is a
function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, mapping each voting profile v = (v1, ..., vn) to a decision
d ≡ g(v).
We denote by s the state of the world. We assume that there are two possible states of
the world s0 and s1, so s ∈ {s0, s1}. By assumption, the prior probability that the state
is s1 is denoted
pi = Pr(s1),
and belongs to (0, 1). Thus, the prior probability that the state is s0 is 1− pi.
Voters have identical preferences, captured by a common utility function u : {0, 1} ×
{s0, s1} → R which maps any decision-state pair (d, s) to its utility u(d, s). The utility
function is given by
u(d, s) =
{
1 if d = sd
0 if d 6= sd . (1)
So, the utility is state-dependent: voters commonly prefer 1 if the state is s1 and they
commonly prefer 0 if the state is s0.
Each voter has a type, representing private information or evidence. A voter’s type is
denoted by t ∈ [0, 1]. The type could represent information that is not shared with other
voters because of a lack of deliberation or limits of deliberation. More generally, a voter
i’s type could represent uncertainty of other voters about i’s beliefs. When we refer to the
type of a particular voter i, we write ti. For each i, ti is distributed randomly according
to the state conditional density f1 or f0 depending on whether the state of the world is s1
or s0. For instance, the probability that t ≤ τ if the state is s1, is given by the expression∫ τ
0 f1(t)dt. We write t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ [0, 1]n for a vector of voters’ types. We denote by
T the random variable generating voters’ types and by S the random variable generating
the state s. When we refer to the particular voter i, we write Ti. We make the following
assumptions.
• Each type is independently drawn given the true state of the world. Formally,
T1, ..., Tn are conditionally independent given S.
• The state conditional densities f1 and f0 are piecewise continuous and f1(t), f0(t) > 0
for all t ∈ [0, 1].
• f0
f1
is weakly decreasing on [0, 1].
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The independence assumption allows us to characterize the joint distribution of the state
and types. The second assumption implies that densities have common support. The last
assumption is commonly used especially in mechanism design problems and is called the
monotone likelihood ratio property. It implies that the distribution of types conditional
on ‘s1’ first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of types conditional on ‘s0’.
Formally, the conditional cumulative distribution function F1 has first-order stochastic
dominance over the conditional cumulative distribution function F0; hence, F0(t) ≥ F1(t)
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. This assumption ensures that types convey information about the state:
the higher values of types are stronger indications of the state being s1. After a voter
receives her type, she submits a vote in {0, 1}. A voting strategy is a function σ : [0, 1]→
{0, 1}, mapping each possible type t ∈ [0, 1] to that type’s vote σ(t) = v. A strategy profile
is a vector σ = (σ1, ...., σn) of strategies across voters.
With a voting rule g and a common utility function u, we now have a well-defined
Bayesian game. For a type profile t, we call a decision d ∈ {0, 1} efficient if it has maximal
expected utility conditional on the full information t, i.e., if it maximises E(u(d, S)|t).
Some common notions of voting behavior can now be adapted to our framework:
• A strategy σ of a voter is informative if there exists a cut-point tˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
σ(t) = 1 if t > tˆ and σ(t) = 0 if t < tˆ for all t ∈ [0, 1]. This strategy is informative in
the sense that it reveals information about the relation between a voter’s type and
the cut-point.
• A strategy σ of a voter is sincere if for every type t, the vote σ(t) maximizes the ex-
pected utility conditional on the information t, i.e., d = σ(t) maximizes E(u(d, S)|t).
A sincere voter acts as if her vote alone determined the decision, which amounts to
optimal behavior in a hypothetical single-player decision problem.
• A strategy profile σ = (σ1, ..., σn) is an equilibrium if each strategy is a best response
to the other strategies, i.e., if the profile is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
Bayesian game.
In the definition of an informative strategy, in order to avoid technicalities, we have
excluded the (anyway uninteresting) cases tˆ ∈ {0, 1}. In particular, given the positivity
of the signal density functions, we have Fs(t) = 0 if and only if t = 0 and Fs(t) = 1
if and only if t = 1, hence, at any cut-point tˆ, we have 0 < Fs(tˆ) < 1. We denote
by σtˆ the informative strategy with cut-point tˆ. The corresponding informative strategy
profile, where each voter votes informatively according to the same cut-point tˆ, is denoted
by σtˆ = (σtˆ1, ..., σ
tˆ
n). Below, when considering informative voting, we always (and only)
consider the case where all voters use the same cut-point. This is a natural assumption,
given that all voters are completely symmetric apart from the realized signals. Since
efficient voting and equilibrium voting in our model coincide – see Section 4 – this means
that we only consider symmetric equilibria. Also, to avoid distraction by special cases,
throughout we exclude parameter combinations such that the probability of more than
one efficient decision is positive. In other words, we assume that for almost every type
profile there is exactly one efficient decision. Finally, our restriction to informative voting
is natural in the following sense: if the voting rule is a quota rule, which means that
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it chooses 1 if an only if the number of 1-votes exceeds a given threshold, then we may
assume that any best reply of a voter is informative – see Section 6.3 for the details.
3 When is informative voting sincere?
In the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem framework, it is generally assumed that inform-
ative voting is sincere; that is, voters are assumed to simply follow the (binary) type in
their votes. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) show that when voters are strategic, this
cannot be taken for granted and holds only under some conditions. We now give a char-
acterization of the parameter combinations where informative voting and sincere voting
coincide in our setting. The proof of this theorem and later theorems can be found in the
Appendix.
Theorem 1 The informative voting strategy with cut-point tˆ ∈ (0, 1) is sincere if and only
if
(i) pi1−pi ≤ f0(tˆ)f1(tˆ) for all t < tˆ, and
(ii) pi1−pi ≥ f0(tˆ)f1(tˆ) for all for all t > tˆ.
Theorem 1 says that an informative strategy is sincere if the cut-point is chosen such
that the ratio of priors is smaller (greater) than the likelihood ratio for the types that are
smaller (greater) than the cut-point. It implies that a sincere informative voting strategy
exists if and only if pi1−pi ∈ (f0(1)f1(1) ,
f0(0)
f1(0)
).4 If f0f1 is continuous, this cut-point satisfies
pi
1−pi =
f0(tˆ)
f1(tˆ)
. There may be an interval of cut-points making the associated informative
strategy sincere. If f0f1 is strictly decreasing, then there is a unique sincere informative
strategy.
4 When is informative voting efficient?
Our objective is to find out whether a voting rule exists which makes informative voting
behavior occur in equilibrium and moreover leads to efficient decisions. Recall that by
saying ‘informative voting’ without referring to a particular voter, we mean informative
voting by all voters according to a common cut-point. Whenever we say that informative
voting is efficient, we mean this voting behavior leads to efficient decisions. Following
a well-known result by McLennan (1998), it is sufficient to find out whether there exist
voting rules which lead to efficient decisions under informative voting, as this also guar-
antees informative voting in equilibrium. In the case where private information takes a
binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ form, there always exist voting rules which efficiently aggregate private
information (see Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996). The next theorem shows that efficient
information aggregation is not always possible when voters’ private information reflects a
4This is a consequence of our assumption that tˆ 6= 0, 1. Without this assumption, we have that a voter
would always choose 0 if pi
1−pi ≤ f0(1)f1(1) and 1 if
pi
1−pi ≥ f0(0)f1(0) .
6
rich spectrum of possibilities instead of only indicating truth or falsity, and characterizes
all parameter combinations for which efficient rules exist. To state our result, we define a
notation first: For each type profile t and cut-point tˆ, we denote nt = |{i : ti ≥ tˆ}|.
Theorem 2 There exists a voting rule g which makes informative voting with cut-point tˆ
efficient if and only if tˆ satisfies
pi
1− pi >
∏
i∈{1,...,n}
f0(ti)
f1(ti)
⇐⇒ pi
1− pi >
(
1− F0(tˆ)
1− F1(tˆ)
)nt (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−nt
(2)
for each type profile t.5
The implication (2) says that a state is more likely to be the true state given all the
available information if and only if it is more likely to be the true state based on the
information about the number of types exceeding the cut-point. In other words, the only
information that should be relevant for information aggregation is the number of types
exceeding the cut-point. Under (2) we can focus on whether each type is above or below
the cut-point, and omit the differences in value.
The proof of Theorem 2 also hints at the kind of rules that make informative voting
efficient, namely quota rules. A quota rule is defined by a threshold m ∈ {0, 1, ..., n+ 1}:
for each voting profile it accepts the issue (hence, leads to d = 1) if and only if at least
m voters accept it. In order to state the next theorem, we define the coefficient m∗ as
follows. Consider all parameter combinations for which there exists a tˆ satisfying (2), and
for tˆ define
K =
{
k ∈ {0, . . . , n} : pi
1− pi >
(
1− F0(tˆ)
1− F1(tˆ)
)k (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−k}
and
m∗ =
{
minK if K 6= ∅
n+ 1 if K = ∅ (3)
This coefficient has a simple interpretation: for s1 to be more probably the true state than
not, there must be at least m∗ individuals whose types exceed the cut-point tˆ in the type
profile.
Theorem 3 If there exists a voting rule which makes informative voting with cut-point tˆ
efficient, then it is the quota rule with the threshold m∗.
As mentioned before, in Section 6.3 we show that under a quota rule it is without loss
of generality to assume that any best reply of a voter is informative. In particular, this
implies that under a quota rule, if decisions are efficient – hence every voter plays a best
reply – then we may assume that voters vote informatively.
We now consider some examples. We start with a combination of parameters where
(2) is satisfied, and a quota rule makes informative voting efficient. We then introduce
5Note that the denominators at the right-hand side are unequal to zero: see Section 3.
7
another example where (2) fails. Under this combination of parameters, we illustrate the
‘best’ rule, which minimizes the probability that the efficient decision is not chosen. As
these examples indicate, condition (2) is only satisfied in exceptional cases. The reader is
referred to Section 6.1 for computations on which these examples are based.
Example 1 Let n = 2 and pi = 0.6. The density functions are
f0(t) =

3
2 if 0 < t <
1
2
1
2 if
1
2 ≤ t ≤ 1,
and
f1(t) =

1
2 if 0 < t <
1
2
3
2 if
1
2 ≤ t ≤ 1.
The likelihood ratio is
f0(t)
f1(t)
=
 3 if 0 < t <
1
2
1
3 if
1
2 ≤ t ≤ 1,
and the corresponding cumulative distribution functions are
F0(t) =

3
2 t if 0 < t <
1
2
1
2 +
1
2 t if
1
2 ≤ t ≤ 1,
and
F1(t) =

1
2 t if 0 < t <
1
2
3
2 t− 12 if 12 ≤ t ≤ 1.
One can easily check that (2) is satisfied for tˆ = 12 . By Theorem 3, the rule that makes
informative voting efficient is the quota rule with the threshold m = 1. Let us see this
graphically. Figure 1 illustrates the types space for two voters, where each axis shows the
type of each voter. The grey region shows all type profiles for which the efficient decision
is d = 1 while the white region shows those for which the efficient decision is d = 0.
Moreover, the quota rule with m = 1 under informative voting with tˆ = 12 leads to 1 for
all the type profiles in the grey area (and to 0 in the white area).
This combination of parameters leads to an equivalent of the binary type model. Given
informative voting with cut-point tˆ = 12 , a voter will vote 1 with probability 1−F1(12) = 34
if the true state is 1, and 0 with probability F0(
1
2) =
3
4 if the true state is 0. Think
of a model with binary signals where a voter receives signal 1 with probability 34 if the
true state is 1 and signal 0 with probability 34 if the true state is 0. If this voter votes
informatively, i.e., in accordance with the signal, and if the quota rule with m = 1 is used,
then this results in the same efficient decisions as the continuous type model. Indeed, in
the model of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), each voter receives a ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’
signal. In our example with continuous signals, the ‘guilty’ signal is represented by all
types in [1/2, 1] and the ‘innocent’ signal is represented by all types in [0, 1/2).
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a)
1
0 1
t1
t2
.5
.5
b)
1
0 1
t1
t2
g(v) = 1
g(v) = 1
g(v) = 1
g(v) = 0
tˆ = .5
tˆ = .5
Figure 1: In a), the grey region shows all type profiles for which d = 1 is the efficient
decision while the white region shows those for which d = 0 is the efficient decision. In b),
the regions illustrate the corresponding decisions under informative voting with cut-point
tˆ = 0.5 when g is the quota rule with m = 1.
Example 2 Let n = 2 and pi = 0.6028. Suppose the density functions are
f0(t) =
e1−t
e− 1 and f1(t) = 1
for each t ∈ [0, 1]. The likelihood ratio is then f0(t)f1(t) = e
1−t
e−1 for each t ∈ [0, 1]. One can
easily see that under this combination of parameters there exists no tˆ ∈ (0, 1) for which (2)
holds. Although we cannot always reach efficiency according to Theorem 2, can we specify
a voting rule and a cut-point which lead to efficient decisions most often? In Figure 2a
below, the area in grey (white) shows all type profiles for which d = 1 (d = 0) is efficient.
Suppose the cut-point tˆ is chosen as in Figure 2b, and consider the quota rule with m = 1.
This rule leads to the ‘wrong’ decision – the decision that is not efficient given the type
profile – under informative voting whenever the type profile falls in the dotted area. If
we instead choose m = 2, the type profiles which lead to the inefficient decision under
informative voting fall in the dotted area given in Figure 2c.
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a)
1
0 1
t1
t2
.5
.5
b)
1
0 1
t1
t2
.5
.5
tˆ
tˆ
c)
1
0 1
t1
t2
.5
.5
tˆ
tˆ
Figure 2: In a), the grey region shows all type profiles for which d = 1 is the efficient
decision while the white region shows those for which d = 0 is the efficient decision. The
dotted areas in b) and c) show those type profiles for which informative voting with a
quota rule is not efficient, for m = 1 and m = 2 respectively.
It is easy to see that the probability of a wrong (inefficient) decision is much less in a
setting such as in Figure 2b. We now calculate the probability that a given type profile
t = (t1, t2) belongs to the dotted area in Figure 2b, assuming that the threshold tˆ takes a
value as shown in the figure. This probability is given by
tˆ∫
1
2
−tˆ
tˆ∫
1
2
−t1
(pif1(t1)f1(t2) + (1− pi)f0(t1)f0(t2))dt2dt1
+2
1
2∫
tˆ
1
2
−t1∫
0
(pif1(t1)f1(t2) + (1− pi)f0(t1)f0(t2))dt2dt1. (4)
This probability is minimal for tˆ = 0.3031. In other words, informative voting with this
cut-point is most efficient. Similarly as in Example 1, the equivalent model with binary
signals is the one where a voter receives signal 1 with probability 0.6969 (namely, 1 − tˆ)
if the true state is 1 and signal 0 with probability 0.417 (namely, F0(tˆ)) if the true state
is 0. If this voter votes informatively, i.e., in accordance with the signal, and if the quota
rule with m = 1 is used, then this results in efficient decisions conditional on the binary
signals.
5 Conclusion
We have considered a model where a group of voters with common interests wants to
accept or reject an issue, where desirability of each outcome depends on the realization
of the state of the world. Departing from the related literature where each voter’s type
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takes the binary form, we have assumed that voters’ types are distributed from a state-
dependent continuous distribution, thus allowing for a more realistic model. In contrast
to the previous results (where informative voting is always and only efficient with quota
rules), efficient information aggregation is possible only under a restrictive condition. This
condition leads to the continuous analogue of the binary type model, which carries no
additional information compared to the binary type model. Hence, it is not possible to
efficiently aggregate continuum of types such as to reflect a richer spectrum of possibilities
than in the binary types model, by a voting rule in which votes are binary.
In the perfectly aligned preferences setting, a natural question that arises is why voters
do not share their private information as this would eventually lead to the implementation
of the efficient decision. Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) analyze the effect of a pre-
voting deliberation in the case of binary signals when there is some degree of heterogeneity
in preferences. Full information sharing occurs when the committee is not too diverse.
Whether a deliberation stage under some heterogeneity in voter preferences may provide
different intuitions in our model depends on how we define deliberation. Deliberation in the
binary signal model can occur in the form of a yes/no straw poll before the actual election
(as, for instance, in Coughlan 2000). Introducing such stage with binary actions would
not improve the result in our setting. When types come from a continuous distribution,
communicating them is not straightforward; hence, the assumption of limited deliberation,
we believe, is well suited here.
6 Appendix: proofs
6.1 Preliminary derivations
Voter i’s belief about the state of the world conditional on her type t is represented by the
expressions Pr(S = s1|T = t) (and Pr(S = s0|T = t)). We abuse notation for simplicity
and we write Pr(s1|t). This expression can be determined as follows:
Pr(s1|t) = lim
∆x→0
Pr(s1|t < T 6 t+ ∆x)
= lim
∆x→0
Pr(s1, t < T 6 t+ ∆x)
Pr(t < T 6 t+ ∆x)
= lim
∆x→0
pif1(t)∆x
(pif1(t1) + (1− pi)f0(t))∆x
=
pif1(t)
pif1(t) + (1− pi)f0(t) . (5)
We can derive a similar expression for Pr(s0|t), which gives
Pr(s0|t) = (1− pi)f0(t)
pif1(t) + (1− pi)f0(t) . (6)
These expressions state the probability of a state s ∈ {s0, s1} conditional on a voter’s type
t ∈ [0, 1]. The probabilities of the states conditional on the full information t ∈ [0, 1]n can
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be derived similarly:
Pr(s1|t) =
pi
∏
i∈{1,...,n} f1(ti)∏
i∈{1,...,n}(pif1(ti) + (1− pi)f0(ti))
(7)
Pr(s0|t) =
(1− pi)∏i∈{1,...,n} f0(ti)∏
i∈{1,...,n}(pif1(ti) + (1− pi)f0(ti))
. (8)
6.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. First, let us assume that σtˆ is sincere for some some cut-point
tˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, for any given type t ∈ [0, 1], E(u(d, S)|t), and equivalently Pr(d|t) is
maximal at d = σtˆ(t). (By maximal, we mean Pr(d|t) ≥ Pr(d′|t) for d′ 6= d.) Let t ≥ tˆ, so
σtˆ(t) = 1. From Pr(s1|t) ≥ Pr(s0|t), we have pi1−pi ≥ f0(t)f1(t) by (5) and (6). Now, let t < tˆ;
hence, Pr(d|t) is maximal at d = 0. From Pr(s0|t) ≥ Pr(s1|t), we have pi1−pi ≤ f0(t)f1(t) by (5)
and (6).
Conversely, suppose tˆ ∈ (0, 1) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of the theorem. We want
to show that σtˆ is sincere; hence, that Pr(d|t) is maximal at d = σtˆ(t) for any given type
t ∈ [0, 1].
Let t < tˆ. This means σtˆ(t) = 0. By (i), pi1−pi ≤ f0(t)f1(t) and Pr(d = 0|t) is maximal by (5)
and (6). Similarly, let t ≥ tˆ, so σtˆ(t) = 1. By (ii), pi1−pi ≥ f0(t)f1(t) . So, Pr(d = 1|t) is maximal
(5) and (6). 
Proof of Theorem 2. For parts (a) and (b) below, suppose a voting rule g makes
informative voting with some cut-point tˆ ∈ (0, 1) efficient. We wish to show that the
following holds for every t:
pi
1− pi >
∏
i∈{1,...,n}
f0(ti)
f1(ti)
⇐⇒ pi
1− pi >
(
1− F0(tˆ)
1− F1(tˆ)
)nt (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−nt
. (9)
(a) First, consider a given type profile t and suppose that a decision d∗ is efficient for
t. This means
Pr(d∗|t) > Pr(d|t) (10)
for d 6= d∗. (Here we use that efficiency ties occur with probability zero and can be
neglected.) Let N t := {i : ti ≥ tˆ}. For all type profiles t′ with σtˆ(t′) = σtˆ(t), we have
ti ≥ tˆ ⇐⇒ t′i ≥ tˆ, or equivalently N t = N t
′
. Moreover, d∗ = g(σtˆ(t)) = g(σtˆ(t′)) is the
common efficient decision for all such profiles. Hence, we can write
Pr(d∗|N t′) > Pr(d|N t′) (11)
for all d 6= d∗ and all t′ (including t) defined as above. Thus, informative voting being
efficient implies that (10) and (11) are equivalent. (In words, efficiency of the chosen
decision at any type profile can only depend on the sets of voters exceeding the cut-points
for p and q.)
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(b) Suppose that
pi
1− pi >
(
1− F0(tˆ)
1− F1(tˆ)
)nt (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−nt
(12)
for some profile t. As |N t| = nt, this can be written as
pi(1− F1(tˆ))|Nt|F1(tˆ)(n−|Nt|) > (1− pi)(1− F0(tˆ))|Nt|F0(tˆ)(n−|Nt|),
which is equivalent to Pr(s1|N t) > Pr(s0|N t). By part (a) of the proof, this is equivalent
to Pr(s1|t) > Pr(s0|t), which, in turn, implies
pi
1− pi >
∏
i∈{1,...,n}
f0(ti)
f1(ti)
(13)
by (7) and (8). Thus, we have proved that the right-hand side of (9) implies the left-hand
side. By converting this argument the converse implication follows.
(c) For the converse implication of the theorem, assume that there is a type tˆ which
satisfies condition (2) for each type profile, and assume informative voting with tˆ as cut-
point. Consider a voting rule g defined as follows for every voting profile v:
g(v) = 1 ⇐⇒ pi
1− pi >
(
1− F0(tˆ)
1− F1(tˆ)
)nv (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−nv
, (14)
where nv is the number of 1-votes in v. We show that g makes informative voting with
tˆ efficient. Consider type profile t and let v = σtˆ(t). Suppose that g(v) = 1. By (14)
and nv = nt, we can write pi1−pi >
(
1−F0(tˆ)
1−F1(tˆ)
)nt (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−nt
. By (2), we have pi1−pi >∏
i∈{1,...,n}
f0(ti)
f1(ti)
. Hence, by (7) and (8), d = 1 is efficient for t. The case where g(v) = 0
can be shown similarly. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a voting rule g : J n → J and suppose g makes
informative voting with some cut-point tˆ efficient. By Theorem 2, tˆ satisfies (2) for every
type profile t. We show that g is the quota rule with threshold m∗.
Consider any type profile t ∈ [0, 1]n and let v = σtˆ(t). Suppose g(v) = 1. By
informative voting being efficient, d = 1 must be efficient; hence, Pr(s1|t) is maximal.
From Pr(s1|t) > Pr(s0|t), we have pi1−pi >
∏
i∈{1,...,n}
f0(ti)
f1(ti)
by (7) and (8). By Theorem 2,
this is equivalent to pi1−pi >
(
1−F0(tˆ)
1−F1(tˆ)
)nt (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−nt
. If we denote the number of 1-votes in
v by nv, this expression can be written as pi1−pi >
(
1−F0(tˆ)
1−F1(tˆ)
)nv (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−nv
since nv = nt
under informative voting. Hence,
g(v) = 1 ⇐⇒ pi
1− pi >
(
1− F0(tˆ)
1− F1(tˆ)
)nv (
F0(tˆ)
F1(tˆ)
)n−nv
,
which, by (3) and by the right hand side of the inequality being decreasing in nv implies
g(v) = 1 ⇐⇒ nv ≥ m∗.

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6.3 Informative voting and best replies
We have shown in the paper that informative voting is not always efficient but if it is,
a quota rule has to be used. Here, we argue that if a quota rule is used and each voter
plays a best reply, then we may assume informative voting. Let nv denote the number of
1-votes in a given voting profile v. Recall that a voting rule g is a quota rule if there is a
k ∈ {0, ..., n+ 1} such that
g(v) =
{
0 if nv < k
1 if nv ≥ k.
Let g be a quota rule, i ∈ {1, ..., n}, and let σi : [0, 1] → {0, 1} be a best reply of voter
i against a strategy profile σ−i of the other voters in the Bayesian game induced by g.
Suppose σi(ti) = 1 for some ti ∈ [0, 1), so that
E(u(g(1,σ−i(t−i)), S|ti) ≥ E(u(g(0,σ−i(t−i)), S|ti) , (15)
where ti is a type profile of the other voters and σi(t−i)) the vector of associated actions.
Consider t′i > ti. Then, we must have
E(u(g(1,σ−i(t−i)), S|t′i) ≥ E(u(g(0,σ−i(t−i)), S|t′i). (16)
To prove (16), since g is a quota rule, we only have to consider the case where g(1,σ−i(t−i))
= 1 and g(0,σ−i(t−i)) = 0; i.e., voter i is pivotal. Note that (15) implies that Pr(S =
s1|ti) ≥ Pr(S = s0|ti), given the strategies of the other voters. Since t′i > ti, it is easy to
derive that then also Pr(S = s1|t′i) ≥ Pr(S = s0|t′i), which in turn implies (16).
Hence, we may assume that σ(t′) = 1. If we let tˆ be the infimum of the set {t ∈ (0, 1) :
σ(t) = 1} – assuming that this infimum is in (0, 1) – then we may assume that voter i
votes informatively with cut-point tˆ.
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